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Even the Dead Will Not Be Safe:  
International Law and the Struggle Over Tradition 
 
Andrew Lang and Susan Marks 
 
 
How and why might we come to know the past? According to Walter Benjamin, ‘the 
past can be seized only as an image that flashes up at the instant when it can be 
recognized and is never seen again’.1 Benjamin continues: ‘To articulate the past 
historically does not mean to recognize it “the way it really was”’. Rather, it ‘means 
to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger’.2 What kind of 
danger? Writing in 1933, Benjamin had a very particular and dreadful peril in mind, 
but he characterises the moment of danger in general terms as ‘a conformism that is 
about to overpower tradition’. ‘In every era’, he writes, ‘the attempt must be made 
anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpower it’.3  
 
Benjamin is presenting here a distinctive vision of history-writing that ties it, on the 
one hand, to the idea of an arresting ‘flash’ that lights up in an instant and is gone, 
and on the other hand, to the idea of tradition that is always on the verge of lapsing 
into conformism. We come to know the past (he seems to be suggesting) not, or not 
primarily, by means of rational explication or interpretation, but through an 
embodied and even perhaps in some sense magical process that enables us to 
recognise and seize the there-and-then in the here-and-now. And we do this – we 
take hold of memories as they flash before us – in order to reclaim the tradition to 
which those memories belong from the forces that would otherwise overpower it. 
For Benjamin, ‘[o]nly that historian will have the gift for fanning the spark of hope in 
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the past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy 
if he [the enemy] wins’.4  
 
Viewed in this light, history-writing – the ‘articulation of the past historically’, in 
Benjamin’s formulation – is a terrain of struggle over tradition. Conversely, the 
struggle over tradition reveals history-writing as an effort to rescue the dead not just 
from obscurity, but from misappropriation, understood by Benjamin as 
appropriation in the service of the ruling order. The English word ‘tradition’, from 
the Latin tradere (to hand over or hand down), refers both to an action and to the 
object of that action. We do certain things at certain times ‘by tradition’. We also 
appeal to ‘tradition’ as a reason for doing things. ‘Traditions’ are our inheritance 
from earlier generations. Theologically speaking, there is divine authority not only in 
the scriptures, but also in oral ‘tradition’. Aesthetically speaking, it is of interest 
when someone follows ‘in the tradition’ of another. In one early and now obsolete 
usage, ‘tradition’ denoted as well the act of giving up, surrender, or – most 
intriguingly, considering what Benjamin writes – betrayal.  
 
International law is a tradition in the sense, and to the extent, that it is made up of 
beliefs, practices, habits and unwritten rules which are handed down and carried 
forward within the community of international lawyers. What is at stake in the 
struggle over this tradition? What forms of conformism currently threaten to 
overpower it? Can historical research ‘fan the spark of hope in the past’ of 
international law by challenging those forms? What would it mean to seize hold of 
international legal history through acts of recognition and apperception, themselves 
occasioned by momentary instances of what Benjamin calls elsewhere ‘profane 
illumination’?5 Our paper takes up these questions. But they are big questions, and 
we will only be able to address them here in a small and suggestive way. In doing so, 
we turn to the manifestly illuminating work of Martti Koskenniemi, which is also 
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profane in Benjamin’s sense that its author penetrates the mysteries of the world as 
a ‘reader’ and ‘thinker’, rather than as a ‘dreamer’ or an ‘ecstatic’.6    
 
We will begin by revisiting Martti’s marvellous study of the history of international 
law, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations.7 Before The Gentle Civilizer was published, Martti 
presented parts of the study in a series of lectures at the University of Cambridge, 
and we will also refer to those. Both in the preliminary lectures and in the book, he 
made very clear the conformist threat to international legal tradition that most 
troubled him: managerialism – the eclipse of ethical engagement and political 
responsibility by a form of professional practice in which international lawyers 
experience and represent themselves as the ‘diplomat’s [and international business 
executive’s] best helper’.8 We propose in what follows that Martti’s history of 
international law can be read as an attempt to counter this threat by recovering a 
practice of responsible moral agency which he takes to have been lost, or badly 
weakened, in contemporary times. How does he go about this? After all, agency is 
not given, but made.9  
 
In the succeeding parts of our paper, we highlight three aspects of his method (if 
that is the right word). One invokes the power of similarity, setting up exemplars or 
role models from the past. Another puts us into contact with the past, such that it 
becomes an active force in the present. A third involves the production of artefacts 
for use in these ways. Similarity and contact recall the phenomenon of ‘sympathetic 
magic’ which anthropologists once saw as a feature of pre-modern cultural life. Thus, 
there was the idea that an effect could be produced simply by imitating it. And there 
was the idea that things or people that had been in contact would continue 
interacting even after contact had been severed. In Benjamin’s hands, sympathetic 
magic becomes the ‘mimetic faculty’, the human ‘gift of producing similarities ... 
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[and] of recognizing them’.10 Benjamin thought the mimetic faculty was at its 
strongest in pre-modern societies, but he did not doubt that it also persisted in 
modernity in multifarious forms. As we shall see, the ‘flash’ that was his way of 
expressing historical comprehension may be one such form.  
 
 
Two Lectures and a Meeting 
In late 1997 Martti Koskenniemi delivered the Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial 
Lectures at the University of Cambridge. The lecture series was inaugurated in 1983 
to commemorate the contribution to international law of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, 
Whewell Professor of International Law at that university from 1938 to 1955. Martti 
began his first lecture by evoking another lecture, delivered in the same city almost 
sixty years earlier by Hersch Lauterpacht himself.11 The occasion was a meeting of 
the Cambridge University League of Nations Union that took place very shortly after 
Lauterpacht’s arrival to take up his chair, in November 1938. At this moment of 
impending war, Lauterpacht stood before the assembled enthusiasts for the League 
of Nations to discuss the failure of international law and institutions to keep the 
peace. As Martti recounts the story, Lauterpacht spoke in a ‘rhetorical, anxious 
tone’,12 appealing directly to his audience: ‘“[W]hat have we to do ...?”’  
Ought we to abandon the League ... ? Ought we to maintain it and adapt it 
to the needs of a retrogressive period? Ought we to [reform it] so as to 
make acceptable for everyone? Ought we to admit that if peace cannot be 
achieved by collective effort, there are other good things than can be 
achieved through it?.13  
 
The answers were clear to Lauterpacht. There must be no giving up on the project of 
liberal internationalism. Equally, however, there could be no denying that the ‘we’ to 
whom he appealed had become thoroughly ‘estranged from the course of inter-war 
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politics – the politics of national over common interests, ... the reign of “short-
sighted benefits” over stable and balanced growth, and the rise of dictatorships “on 
a scale unprecedented in history”’.14 How were he and his audience to deal with this 
estrangement? The strategy they needed to adopt appears to have been no less 
clear to Lauterpacht. Just as, centuries earlier, the man whom he regarded as the 
‘father’ of international law, Hugo Grotius, had ‘[sought] authority from the customs 
of the Romans’, so Lauterpacht would invite his audience to ‘[turn] to the past’.15 He 
and they would retain their relevance, hold onto their principles, and fight back in 
the name of their community, their tradition, by recovering the memory of ‘“better 
peoples and better times”’.16 Thus, Martti reports:  
To find a place for law in a dangerous time, Lauterpacht looked back to the 
middle of nineteenth century, hoping to resuscitate its liberal rationalism 
and its ideal of the rule of law, its belief in progress, its certainty about the 
sense and direction of history.17 
Martti writes of the ‘tone of unmitigated Victorian nostalgia’ that inflected 
Lauterpacht’s lecture as he spoke of the ‘heyday of the bourgeois century’ and 
lamented the decline of progressive outlooks, initiatives and institutions since that 
time.18 In Lauterpacht’s words, ‘How immeasurably far backwards do we seem to 
have travelled from those days of unbounded optimism?’19 As is indicated also in the 
passage quoted above, Lauterpacht regarded the interwar years as a period of 
‘retrogression’. In Martti’s gloss, this was a ‘retrogression from the cosmopolitanism 
that inspired Wilson in Paris in 1918-19, but which owes its origin to the high 
liberalism of a century earlier’.20 Yet if Lauterpacht ‘never gave up’ the liberal ideals 
of the nineteenth century,21 Martti observes that he also belonged firmly in the 
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‘modernist camp’ of the twentieth century.22 Believing that ‘[l]aw is how it is 
interpreted’, he hewed to a sophisticated modern interpretivism that stressed the 
‘primacy of interpretation over substance, [and] process over rule’. This led him into 
‘an institutional pragmatism that’, Martti notes, ‘is ours too’.23  
 
As Martti presents him, then, Lauterpacht ‘bridges the gap between the liberal 
rationalism of the nineteenth century and the functional pragmatism of the late 
twentieth century’. His commitment to Victorian ideals of progress and the 
‘harmony of interests’ combines with a modern ‘hermeneutics of judging’ to give his 
work both a ‘historical and contemporary feel’. Martti concludes: ‘Close and distant 
at the same time, [Lauterpacht] is uniquely placed to provide an understanding of 
why it is that we stand now where we do’.24 So where do we stand now (or where 
did we stand in 1997, when Martti delivered his lecture)? In the discussion that 
followed this evocation of Lauterpacht’s 1938 address to the Cambridge University 
League of Nations Union, as well as in Martti’s other speeches and texts, it emerged 
that his interest in Lauterpacht was occasioned at least in part by a belief that the 
later twentieth century too was a period of decline and fall for international law. For 
Martti, this fall consisted of a descent into precisely that functional pragmatism 
which Lauterpacht had anticipated. By the end of the twentieth century, functional 
pragmatism had become pervasive ‘managerialism’.  
 
In Martti’s telling, the ‘managerial’ mindset sees international law as functionally 
responsive to the objectives, values and interests of states, and assesses it by 
reference to its effectiveness in facilitating the achievement of those objectives, 
values and interests.25 Managerial international lawyers tend to lose sight of the gap 
between law as an instrument and law as a ‘surface over which we carry out our 
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projects and ... criticize those of others’.26 At the same time, managerial 
international lawyers are disposed to treat the law’s purposes as given, asking only 
questions about how those purposes should be implemented, rather than ‘engaging 
the point of international law’ as an object of contestation.27  As they imagine and 
undertake it, the role of the international lawyer is to be ‘counsel for the functional 
power-holder’; there is no, or only very limited, space for acting as a ‘moral 
politician’ who uses ‘critical reason [to] measure today’s state of affairs from the 
perspective of an ideal of universality’.28 At its worst, managerialism obscures ‘the 
way power works and [makes] particular intellectual or social hierarchies appear as 
natural aspects of our lives’.29 
 
Martti writes that, like Lauterpacht, ‘we too are historically situated in a project that 
is not only an abstract exercise in ideas but a continuum of political, moral and 
professional choices’.30 If managerialism inclines us to forget this, then for Martti 
international legal renewal depends on recovering the memory. In practical terms, 
the challenge is to locate resources that could engender a sense of responsible moral 
agency in the professional practice and self-image of the international lawyer. 
Following his forebear, Martti finds these resources by turning to the past. The 
Gentle Civilizer of Nations famously traces the origins of modern international law to 
the ‘men of 1873’: a group of European lawyers, diplomats and politicians who met 
in Ghent in September 1873 to inaugurate the Institut de droit international. As he 
depicts them, these men were people with projects: not ‘philosopher-lawyers’, but 
men of action; practical, engaged men, who were convinced that the role of the 
lawyer was to contribute to social progress, rather than observe it from a scholarly 
distance.31 Domestically, their causes were characteristic of mid-century Victorian 
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liberalism: penal reform, electoral reform and enfranchisement, child labour, 
universal education.32 Internationally, their instincts were cosmopolitan.  
 
Despite the economic depression of the 1870s, these men were advocates for 
freedom of commerce and the protection of property rights, taking such measures 
to be integral to any strategy for assuring peace among nations. Disturbed by the 
conduct of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71, they looked to humanitarian law to 
make hostilities less savage. They urged arbitration as a means of international 
dispute settlement, and encouraged efforts to promote mutual understanding 
between nations, in the interests of securing peace and preventing unnecessary war. 
Above all, they adhered to a vision of law which conceived it not as sovereign 
command, but as the emanation of a ‘popular consciousness’, itself best understood 
as ‘popular ‘conscience’. To them, the jurist’s task was to act as the mouthpiece of 
that popular consciousness/conscience, discerning its content through scientific 
reason, philosophical reflection and historical enquiry.33 Against that backdrop, 
Martti shows how the men of 1873 came to understand their role in highly 
moralised terms, and to represent their new profession (now notoriously) as the 
‘legal conscience of the civilized world’.34 It is this moralised sensibility which, in 
Martti’s telling, most clearly sets these inaugural international legal professionals 
apart from the managerialists of today.  
 
We have given, we hope, a fair account of Martti’s diagnosis and prescription. But 
how is the recovery to occur? Historical investigation can put before us a moralised, 
as distinct from managerialist, sensibility, but how is it to make that image impinge 
on lived reality? It is a striking part of Martti’s wager that ‘connection’ is the real 
battle in the struggle over international legal tradition. Through Martti, we connect 
with Lauterpacht, and beyond him, with the men of 1873. Through Martti’s 
connection with Lauterpacht, we also connect with the earlier nineteenth century 
‘classical liberals’, and still further back, with Grotius. At one level, this 
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multigenerational story spanning centuries simply signals that there exists a shared 
disciplinary tradition to which all international lawyers belong. It situates us on a 
common historical trajectory. In doing so, it emphasises the importance of 
individuals and their projects, and invites us to consider the specific conditions under 
which those individuals became as they were and acted as they did, along with the 
specific contexts in which their projects arose, took shape and were (more or less 
conflictually) pursued. At another level, however, Martti’s multigenerational account 
plainly invites us to consider as well what those individuals and their projects might 
mean to us.  
Lauterpacht and the men of 1873 appear as, in some way, role models. While Martti 
comments on Lauterpacht’s tone of unmitigated nostalgia, he is certainly aware that 
his own writing has a tone of nostalgia too. That is part of the sense in which 
Lauterpacht is a role model. The original meaning of nostalgia was homesickness. 
First discussed in the seventeenth century, it was an illness diagnosed in Swiss 
mercenaries fighting in the lowlands of northern France and Italy who became sick 
from longing for the mountains of home. Nostalgia comes, as we know, from feelings 
of loss and estrangement. Of course, Martti’s admiration for Lauterpacht and the 
men of 1873 is by no means uncritical. It is plain that the world in which they lived is 
not one to which he would seek to return. Nonetheless, the thrust of his narrative is 
that there was something valuable in the work of Lauterpacht and the men of 1873 
which has been lost, and that that loss is our loss. The estrangement from some 
form of moralised sensibility, Martti seems to suggest, has estranged us from our 
tradition and thus also from ourselves. In putting this across, Martti asks us to notice 
Lauterpacht’s feel, which is both antiquated or ‘historical’ and ‘contemporary’. 
Holding up to our eyes his shifting telescope, he leads us to see that Lauterpacht is at 
once ‘distant’ and ‘close’. Like Martti himself, Lauterpacht becomes a ‘bridge’ which 
connects us to the past – and does so not just in a symbolic way, but also through 
the senses.  
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As foreshadowed in our introductory remarks, our own wager is that this 
phenomenon of ‘connection’ has something to do with the exercise of what 
Benjamin called the mimetic faculty. To explore this further, we need now to make a 
short theoretical side-trip to (re)familiarise ourselves with the main, relevant 
contours of the concept to which Benjamin himself appeals: mimesis. 
 
 
On Mimesis and Sympathetic Magic 
Mimesis is a concept with a tangled and fascinating history.35 An ancient Greek term, 
it is most commonly translated into English as ‘imitation’, but also sometimes 
translated as, or associated with, a variety of other terms, including: 
correspondence, emulation, resemblance, mimicry, verisimilitude, representation, 
depiction, realism, repetition, simulation and duplication. The word comes from the 
root mimos, meaning a person who imitates, as well as a particular theatrical or 
perhaps dance genre of the time that revolved around imitation. Although he did not 
invent the term, Plato appears to have set the initial, and in some respects enduring, 
frame of reference for thinking about the concept of mimesis. He used the term to 
theorise representation and what he took to be its dangers. Representation posed 
for Plato the question of the relation between images and reality. Inasmuch as that 
is a relation of similarity, but necessarily also of difference, the thrust of his analysis 
was that representation opens the way to distortion, deception and manipulation. 
Mimesis encourages us to think we are confronted with reality when in fact we are 
confronted with biased and falsifying images. Plato’s student, Aristotle, was 
famously more positive in his assessment of aesthetic representation. To him, 
mimesis might not be without dangers, but it is also a matter of great skill and has 
the capacity to promote virtue and understanding.  
 
Accounts of mimesis indicate that, from Roman times until eighteenth century, the 
term was most commonly rendered as the Latin imitatio. Whereas for Plato and 
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Aristotle, the focus was on the imitative relationship between images and reality or 
between art and life, for thinkers of these later times a primary concern was the 
imitative relationship between a master and his (or, much more rarely, her) 
disciples. Thus, mimesis came to refer to the emulation of exemplary forerunners. 
Importantly, a distinction appears to have been drawn between emulation and 
‘mere’ copying. Aspiring artists and writers were taught to use skill and judgement in 
learning from role models and deploying old forms in new ways. Beginning around 
the seventeenth century, however, this way of approaching artistic activity and 
knowledge production began very evidently to lose ground. Descartes articulated a 
philosophical ‘method’ that involved searching ‘for no knowledge other than what 
can be found within myself’.36 Later philosophers and artists likewise emphasised 
contemplation and originality – the individual genius, rather than the fertile tradition 
– as the basis of scholarly insight and artistic achievement.  
 
But if modernity became principally preoccupied with liberation from tradition, 
modern (and postmodern) theorists went on to use the concept of mimesis to 
highlight and investigate a huge array of ways in which ‘the doctrine of the similar’37 
nonetheless remained pivotal. Their work spans literary theory,38 psychoanalytic 
theory,39 critical social theory,40 historiographical theory,41 anthropology,42 post-
colonial theory,43 and art and architectural theory,44 among other bodies of thought. 
In very general terms, it seems that at least two themes run through this literature. 
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One is the idea that what we may imagine as ‘autonomous’ often has an imitative 
aspect. This may be unconscious, as with Freud’s theory of identification with others 
as the basis of selfhood. Or it may be conscious, as with literary accounts of 
convention, influence and the confidence or anxiety associated with it. But either 
way, mimesis points to the difference that lies at the core of identity, the succession 
without which there can be no initiative. The second theme concerns the 
ambiguities of imitation. Is it a compliment to the one imitated or an insult? Scholars 
remind us that satire and parody work by producing resemblances, and so too does 
mimicry. In an important contribution to post-colonial theory, Homi Bhabha 
postulates a concept of ‘colonial mimicry’.45 From the perspective of the coloniser, 
the colonised must be sufficiently similar to be ‘civilisable’, but sufficiently different 
to justify domination. Yet this condition of being ‘almost the same, but not quite’ is 
also unsettling, inasmuch as colonial authority is threatened by a mimetic relation 
that is inevitably ‘at once resemblance and menace’.46 
 
The conjunction of resemblance and menace is one way in which the ambiguities of 
mimesis may be felt, but it is not the only one. To bring out another, it is helpful to 
return for a moment to Renaissance imitatio. In his study of mimesis, Matthew 
Potolsky recalls the account given in 1336 by the Italian poet Petrarch of his ascent 
of Mount Ventoux in southern France.47 Petrarch explains that he wanted to make 
the climb because of a passage he had read in Livy. Livy recounts in this passage how 
Philip of Macedon had climbed Mount Haemus in Thrace because he believed that 
he would be able to see from the summit as far as Italy in the west and the Danube 
in the north, and this would help him as he contemplated war with Rome. Potolsky 
observes that ‘Petrarch’s desire is imitative’; he wants to climb a mountain in order 
to gain an expansive view, just as the ancient king Philip of Macedon had done. Yet 
‘this imitation is complicated by ambivalence’.48 For it was part of the point of Livy’s 
retelling that Philip never got to see the anticipated panorama: the summit of Mount 
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Haemus was shrouded in mist when he reached it, so his journey was futile and he 
only succeeded in exhausting his troops.49 As Potolsky reads it, the ‘example of Philip 
suggests that, although the ancients remain a source of inspiration for the present, 
their path is fatally flawed’. Petrarch plainly finds something inspiring in Livy’s story 
of Philip. He seeks to ‘retain the idea of classical imitation [but] without necessarily 
endorsing all the ideals of the classical world’.50  
 
So far we have seen that mimesis confronts us with the role of imitation in human 
and social affairs. It also confronts us with the ambiguities of imitation, whether 
because there is mocking menace as well as resemblance, or, more benignly, 
because what is involved is inspiration rather than endorsement in all respects. 
Insofar as imitation is a token of admiration, the concept of mimesis delivers a 
reminder that that admiration is rarely unmixed or without some reservation or 
disquiet, and that a heightened awareness of imperfections may be among the by-
products of enthusiastic copying. Our focus to this point has been on mimesis in the 
relation between images and reality (art and life, narrative and experience, 
representation and truth) and in the relation between people or groups of people 
(master and disciple, self and other, coloniser and colonised). However, mimesis 
does not arise only in those relations, and before concluding this brief survey of 
ideas associated with the concept of mimesis, we should note an influential strand in 
the study of mimesis that goes back to the work in the late nineteenth century of the 
Scottish anthropologist and scholar of comparative religion, James Frazer.  
 
Frazer’s monumental work The Golden Bough (first published in 1890) is commonly 
credited with being the first systematic study of the practices and principles of 
‘magic’.51 The study was based mostly on information about the non-European world 
related to Frazer by other anthropologists and by travellers, but it also included 
discussion of European practices, both pre-Christian and, controversially, within 
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Christianity. Frazer argued that magic revolved around two general principles.52 One, 
which he called the ‘Law of Similarity’, was that ‘like produces like, or that an effect 
resembles its cause’. Thus the ‘magician infers that he can produce any effect he 
desires merely by imitating it’. The second, which Frazer called ‘the Law of Contact’, 
was that ‘things which have once been in contact with each other continue to act on 
each other at a distance after the physical contact has been severed’. Here the 
magician ‘infers that whatever he does to a material object will affect equally the 
person with whom the object was once in contact’. Frazer proposed that both these 
‘laws’ could be ‘comprehended under the general name of Sympathetic Magic’ – 
‘sympathetic’, because ‘both assume that things act on each other at a distance 
through a secret sympathy’.53  
 
Frazer’s idea of sympathetic magic extends the discussion of mimesis so that it 
encompasses not only the relation between images and reality and between people 
or groups of people, but also the relation between people and objects. Indeed, his 
idea extends mimesis so that it encompasses the entire animate and inanimate 
worlds in their complex interrelation. As Potolsky puts it, The Golden Bough 
describes a ‘sympathetic network [that] binds humans, animals and objects in a kind 
of mimetic network of reciprocal influence’.54 Frazer discusses examples of imitative 
magic that include the burning of effigies of people to whom harm is desired to be 
done, and the display of images or totems of fish, birds and other animals to 
encourage food supply. He also discusses examples that show how contact activates 
the mimetic magic in a special way. Body parts, clothing and footprints are treated as 
though they maintained a connection to the person to whom they belonged long 
after any physical connection to that person has been broken. In one practice, a 
woman digs up earth from a man’s footprint, puts it in a pot, and plants a flower in it 
so as to cause love to blossom between them.55  
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As these examples also illustrate, sympathetic magic involves the production of 
artefacts – effigies, totems, flower-pots –  and their use to take advantage of 
correspondences between the animate and inanimate. On the one hand, the 
artefact may work by imitation or representation – an effigy that resembles a 
person, a totem that mimics the swimming of a fish. On the other hand, it may trade 
on contiguity or on the power of what Frazer terms ‘contagion’ – a flower that acts 
on the ‘owner’ of a footprint out of the soil of which it was grown. In both cases, the 
artefact brings what is distant into active relation with those near at hand. The 
anthropologist Michael Taussig has drawn on Frazer’s work to explore the 
phenomenon of mimesis in capitalist modernity.56 Taussig is particularly interested 
in this artefactual aspect. He highlights ‘the notion emerging from Frazer’s discussion 
of imitative magic as power that the copy extracts from the original’.57 To Taussig, 
copies do not merely reflect their original; they interact with their original in a way 
that renders the latter susceptible of appropriation and influence. In his words, ‘[t]he 
wonder of mimesis lies in the copy drawing on the character and power of the 
original, to the point whereby the representation may even assume that character 
and that power.’58 
 
Fanning the Spark of Hope in the Past  
Our side-trip has taken us across many branches of thought and many, widely 
disparate historical epochs. For all that this concept is concerned with similarity and 
contact, it is a feature of accounts of mimesis that they have a decidedly dizzying 
quality, and we recognise that ours may be no exception. Steadying ourselves now, 
we can begin to discern some elements that bear on the issues we raised earlier. You 
will recall that our interest was in the tradition of international law, and that we 
found in Martti Koskenniemi’s work the argument that managerialism is the 
‘conformism’ that currently threatens this tradition. We followed something of 
Martti’s attempt to wrest the tradition of international law away from its 
managerialist orthodoxy by recovering a moralised sensibility and commitment to 
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responsible agency that existed in former times.59 This took him back to Hersch 
Lauterpacht in the 1930s and earlier still, to the founders of the Institut de droit 
international in 1873, with their sense of being the ‘legal conscience of the civilized 
world’. What unfolded was a multigenerational story in which Lauterpacht served as 
a bridge, connecting us to the past.  
 
What is to be gleaned from our discussion of mimesis? In the first place, similarity is 
plainly central to Martti’s method. As already suggested, Lauterpacht and the men of 
1873 are presented as, in some way, role models. The logic of Martti’s story is that 
these men incarnate the kind of sensibility we need to recover. From the perspective 
of his critique of managerialism in international law, they are our exemplary 
forerunners, the ancestors on whom we should model ourselves. Just as a crowd 
might seek to produce harm to a person by burning him in effigy or a community 
might seek to produce an abundance of fish by scattering fish-shaped totems in the 
sea, so Martti seeks to produce a new generation of morally charged international 
lawyers by prompting the imitation of earlier generations of them. Importantly, 
however, the principle of similarity is not the principle of sameness. Needless to say, 
Martti is not seeking to encourage the revival of a professional self-identity as the 
‘legal conscience of the civilized world’. Nor is Lauterpacht’s ‘liberal rationalism, 
ideal of the rule of law, belief in progress, and certainty about the sense and 
direction of history’ a helpful outlook for the project Martti envisages. Like Petrarch 
following in the footsteps of Philip of Macedon – or rather, like Livy narrating the 
story of Philip – Martti offers his history as a source of inspiration, inviting us to 
imitate these international lawyers from the past but without necessarily endorsing 
all the ideals they espoused. 
 
Secondly, Martti’s method also involves contact. Like the law of similarity, the law of 
contact presupposes that things act on each other at a distance. That distance may 
be spatial – a distant location – but, as we have just seen, it may also be temporal – a 
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distant time or distant times. There is no soil to dig up from the footprints of those 
who lived long ago, and nor are there generally any body parts left or items of 
clothing. But the metonymic principle of contiguity still finds forms of expression 
that are distinct from those associated with the metaphorical principle of 
resemblance. Martti reports that Lauterpacht is reputed to have kept an engraving 
of Grotius on the wall of his study.60 If true, Grotius died in 1645 and Martti does not 
say when the engraving was made and, in particular, whether it was made before 
1645. But this surely does not matter. Whether or not the engraving had ever had –  
or could ever have had – any direct physical contact with Grotius, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that Lauterpacht hoped to produce by it a kind of contagion 
through which Grotius would act on his (Lauterpacht’s) thoughts and on his writing, 
and would guide him in his work. We have seen that Martti hopes to produce a kind 
of contagion too. He wants to bring Lauterpacht himself into our world, and to make 
us ‘see’ and ‘feel’ him as a presence who might act on us.  
 
A third aspect of Martti’s method concerns the production of artefacts. It is, for the 
most part, things that do the work of activating mimetic connection. These things 
may be fabricated objects, like effigies, totems, flower-pots or engravings. They may 
also be intellectual products like texts. Petrarch only knew about Philip of Macedon’s 
ascent of Mount Haemus because he read about it in Livy’s History of Rome. And 
reading about it there, he was evidently struck by something in Livy’s telling of the 
story. But it seems that what really inspired Petrarch was the classical idea of 
imitation – Roman imitatio – itself. He set out to recapture it and give it fresh life in 
post-classical times. Livy’s text was able to inspire Petrarch to imitate Philip because 
it was a point of contact with this idea. Might we think of Martti’s various texts in a 
similar way? If so, they can be understood to perform something of the function of 
the flower-pot in the south Slavic practice we mentioned earlier. Just as the flower-
pot serves to put the woman into contact with the distant owner of the footprint, so 
the text would serve to put us into contact with earlier generations of international 
lawyers. And just as the flower-pot is made out of the footprint but does not 
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resemble the footprint or its owner, so the relation between the text and those 
earlier generations would not be a relation of fidelity. It would need to be rooted in 
or ‘made out of’ the historical evidence, but it would depend less on faithful 
accuracy – on presenting the past ‘the way it really was’ (to recall Benjamin’s phrase) 
– than on correspondence. 
 
Texts are one thing, but as described in earlier sections of this paper, Martti has not 
only written about our connection to Lauterpacht and the men of 1873. With his 
Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial lecture and its evocation of Lauterpacht’s own lecture 
in the same city almost sixty years earlier, he has also performed it. As recalled 
earlier, the word ‘mimesis’ was originally associated with a particular kind of 
performance, though apparently little is known about the genre. Whilst performance 
is amongst the simplest kinds of mimetic artefact, it may involve forms of imitation, 
impersonation or simulation that are quite subtle. Martti tells of how Lauterpacht 
confessed at the outset of his 1938 lecture to the Cambridge University League of 
Nations Union that his subject was one ‘about which he felt so strongly that he was 
unable to trust the “freely spoken word”’; he would ‘read from a manuscript in order 
to maintain restraint and deliberation’.61 But in fact, Martti recounts, Lauterpacht 
did not did not always maintain his usual high standard of restraint and deliberation 
in this lecture. Lapsing into ‘informality and engagement’, he ‘switched to the first 
personal plural’ and posed the questions we quoted earlier on (‘[W]hat have we to 
do ...?’ etc.).62  Martti’s own complex interweaving of biography and autobiography, 
historical narrative and apparent personal disclosure63 replicates this, closing the gap 
between the ‘first persons’ of the past and present by bringing them together in the 
body of the speaker and the circumstances of the performance.  
 
We have spoken a lot in this paper about Martti Koskenniemi’s work on the history 
of international law because we find it inspiring and contagious and truly inimitable. 
But we are also intrigued by the possibilities of the mimetic faculty for historical 
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scholarship in the international legal field more generally. We noted earlier 
Benjamin’s characterisation of the mimetic faculty as the ‘human gift of producing 
similarities ... [and] of recognising them’. In a similar vein, Taussig writes of the 
mimetic ‘sixth sense’.64 It seems likely to us that this gift or sixth sense is itself socio-
historically produced. The history of mimesis is presumably also the history of the 
mimetic faculty. Leaving that vast terrain of enquiry to one side, what fascinates us is 
the way, with mimesis, the copy becomes the thing. As Taussig puts it in a passage 
we quoted earlier, the copy ‘[draws] on the character and power of the original, to 
the point whereby the representation may even assume that character and that 
power’. Of course, others have theorised this phenomenon in many different ways.65 
But here we want to follow Taussig in stressing its artefactual dimensions. Mimesis 
is, above all, about making things – not (for the most part) things to be exchanged, 
but things to be used, and not things for instrumental use, but things for ‘magical’ 
use, things for use in establishing sympathetic connection across space and time.  
 
The anthropologist Marilyn Strathern has written of a way of thinking about history 
in the Melanesian societies that she has studied in which the focus is less on 
interpretation than on ‘improvisation’.66 In this way of thinking, history is seen not as 
material to be synthesised, contextualised and decoded, but as a basis for 
improvised ‘performances’. These performances are, in turn, seen as significant for 
their ‘effects’: they are for use ‘the way [one] may use a knife’; one should create 
things with them ‘the way [one] may create a mask’.67 What kind of use? Create 
things to do what? Strathern reports that, in the practices she has studied, one 
aspect is to show ‘how people act as though they had power when confronted with 
the untoward’.68 We have been concerned in this paper with the untoward, in the 
shape of Benjamin’s ‘conformism that is about to overpower tradition’. How can 
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people act as though they retained power when their tradition is on the verge of 
being overpowered? The move we have discussed is to turn to the past. On this 
premise, it is in the earlier generations that the ‘spark of hope’ is to be found. The 
past may be a foreign country, yet those not residing there can be enabled to ‘go-
between’.69 We can seize the past and bring it into active relation to the present. But 
if Benjamin is right, we can only seize it as an ‘image that flashes up at the instant 
when it can be recognized’ and then is gone. The ‘flash’ of recognition reveals history 
not simply as a set of facts to be known, but as a force to be felt, a secret sympathy 
to be sensed, and an occasion to be grasped for producing new artefacts that might 
be used to activate new connections. 
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